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Balkin: Respect-Worthy: Frank Michelman and the Legitimate Constitution

RESPECT-WORTHY: FRANK MICHELMAN
AND THE LEGITIMATE CONSTITUTION

Jack M. Balkin*
When people gather to celebrate the contributions of a preeminent scholar
like Frank Michelman, the most likely focus of discussion will be the important
papers that scholar wrote in years past that have helped define a field and have
taken on a canonical status. Frank has certainly written his share of those, and in
a number of different areas of legal study. But there is special enjoyment in
engaging the ideas of a great scholar that are still being formed and polished. So I
take considerable pleasure in devoting my remarks today to Frank's recent work
in constitutional theory. This work begins, more or less, with his 1999 book,
Brennan
and Democracy,1 and has continued through a series of short papers and
2
essays. Frank's focus in these essays, as in much of his work generally, is on the
intersection between constitutional theory and liberal political theory; his topic is
constitutional legitimacy in a liberal state. Frank wants to know under what
conditions a constitutional democracy with a system of judicial review roughly
resembling that in the United States can properly make claims to democratic
legitimacy, given a world of strong disagreement about the most important issues
in political life.' After all, when judges on a constitutional court interpret the
country's basic law, they often prevent governments from doing all sorts of things
that some people think are necessary to achieve justice. Conversely, judges may
permit governments (and individuals) to do all sorts of things that some people
think are very unjust indeed. Given very serious disagreements about what is just
* Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School. My
thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Willy Forbath, Frank Michelman, Sandy Levinson, and Reva Siegel for
their comments on previous drafts.
1. Frank I. Michelman, Brennan and Democracy (Princeton U. Press 1999). This book, in turn, is a
revised version of his Brennan Lecture, given the previous year. See Frank I. Michelman, Brennan and
Democracy, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 399 (1998).
2. See Frank I. Michelman, Is the Constitution a Contractfor Legitimacy?, 8 Rev. Constl. Stud. 101
(2004) [hereinafter Michelman, Contract for Legitimacy]; Frank I. Michelman, Living with Judicial
Supremacy, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 579 (2003) [hereinafter Michelman, Judicial Supremacy]; Frank I.
Michelman, Ida's Way: Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental System, 72 Fordham L. Rev.
345 (2003) [hereinafter Michelman, Ida's Way]; Frank I. Michelman, Faith and Obligation, or, What
Makes Sandy Sweat?, 38 Tulsa L. Rev. 651 (2003) [hereinafter Michelman, Faith and Obligation];
Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Legitimation for PoliticalActs, 66 Modern L. Rev. 1 (2003); Frank
I. Michelman, Human Rights and the Limits of Constitutional Theory, 13 Ratio Juris 63 (2000)
[hereinafter Michelman, Human Rights]; Frank I. Michelman, ConstitutionalAuthorship by the People,
74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1605 (1999) [hereinafter Michelman, ConstitutionalAuthorship].
3. Michelman, Contractfor Legitimacy, supra n. 2.
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and unjust, and about the rights and duties that people have, Frank wants to know
how constitutional law and the practice of judicial review can be legitimate within
a liberal and democratic state.
I.

GETTING SOME RESPECT

To answer this question, of course, we need to have a handle on the concept
of legitimacy itself. By legitimacy, Frank means something more than merely legal
validity in a positivist sense, and something less than complete justice. Rather,
legitimacy is a feature of legal systems that makes them worthy of respect, so that
people living in legitimate legal systems have reasons to accept the use of state
coercion to enforce laws that they do not necessarily agree with and may even
think quite unjust. Thus, legitimacy means respect-worthiness: even if the law
doesn't conform to what we would like the law to be, and even if we lose when we
attempt to change the law, we still respect the legal system as a whole and we
accept the fact that it is permissible for the state to use its coercive power to
require people to abide by the law and work within the legal parameters of the
4
system.
A constitution and a system of judicial review, Frank says, is a way of
ensuring this legitimacy or respect-worthiness. Conversely, the legal system can
become illegitimate or lacking in respect if the constitution lacks important
features or if the means of implementing it, for example, through judicial review
by unelected judges, fail to meet the standards of respect-worthiness.
So a constitution, and the ancillary practice of judicial review, can be a
method of ensuring respect-worthiness, or it can be a feature of the system that
undermines its respect-worthiness. For example, if you think that what judges are
doing is tyrannical, or contrary to the rule of law, then the practice of judicial
review might not promote the legitimacy of the constitutional order; it might
detract from it.5 The question is how the constitutional order can be framed so
that people who don't necessarily agree about a lot of things in politics and social
life can nevertheless all assent to the legitimacy of the constitutional and legal
order under which they live, and can accept the use of state force to compel
themselves and others to abide by whatever the law happens to be.
Frank considers a number of different theories about how the American
Constitution (and the related practice of judicial review) might help produce
legitimacy or respect-worthiness. One theory says that the Constitution produces
legitimacy because of the people who authored it (or ratified it). The second says
that the Constitution helps produce legitimacy because people just seem to accept
it as an ongoing social practice. The third says that the constitutional order has
legitimacy because of its substantive content: the procedures it offers for political
decisionmaking, the rights it recognizes, the limits on government action it

4. See Michelman, Ida's Way, supra n. 2, at 346-47.
5. See Michelman, Judicial Supremacy, supra n. 2, at 607-11.
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imposes, and so on. The first two justifications
Frank calls "content-independent,"
6
the third he calls "content-based.,
Can content-based justifications provide
the requisite degree of legitimacy?
7
Frank does not think that they can.
That is because the content of the
constitutional order is either going to be too thick or too thin. If it is too thick, it
will not be able to command the assent of everyone; if it is too thin, people won't
know what they are agreeing to.
People will rightly want to know whether the Constitution protects or does
not protect abortion rights, whether the death penalty is constitutional or not,
whether racial profiling is permitted or not permitted, whether pornography can
be sold in stores, whether the president can make war with or without a previous
declaration of war by Congress, whether the Supreme Court can order taxes to be
raised to finance a school desegregation order, and so on. That is, before people
give their assent to the legitimacy of the constitutional scheme, they will want to
know exactly what it is that they are buying into. What is at stake, after all, is the
acceptance of the legitimacy of state coercion, not only directed against others, but
against one's self. And nobody should accept without some assurances about
what the Constitution requires, permits, and guarantees.
This leads to a dilemma: If we identify the Constitution only with its text, the
text of the Constitution really doesn't tell us enough about what it permits,
requires, or forbids. It doesn't provide enough information about the nature of
the deal to justify everyone's reasonable assent to state coercion. You would
never know from the text of the Constitution, for example, whether abortion is
protected or not protected from criminalization, or even whether the government
can create paper money as legal tender for all debts public and private. We don't
know whether there are political parties, whether administrative agencies can or
do exist, what degree of delegation of legislative, executive, and judicial functions
to these agencies is permitted, whether congressional-executive agreements are
permitted, and whether the president may commit troops overseas without a
formal declaration of war. You might have views about any or all of these
questions, but it would just be your interpretation, and you could easily see how
people could and would disagree, and you would have no assurances that the
Constitution in practice would conform to your interpretations. In short, if the
Constitution is just the text, most people wouldn't have enough information
rationally to assent to the legitimacy of the constitutional system.
However, the more we fill in the details of the Constitution-by including
for example, the decisions of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, and
the institutions and practices that create governmental structures and enforce
constitutional norms (what Keith Whittington has called "constitutional

6. Michelman, Contractfor Legitimacy, supra n. 2, 125-27.
7. Id. at 123-24; see Michelman, Judicial Supremacy, supra n. 2, at 609-11; Michelman, Ida's Way,
supra n. 2, at 362-63; Michelman, Faith and Obligation,supra n. 2, at 666-67.
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construction 8)-so that 'people can decide what the Constitution means in
practice, the more likely it is that some people will find that the Constitution
doesn't match their minimum conditions of legitimacy. (Frank doesn't mention
constitutional construction in his arguments, but I think it makes them even
stronger.) For example, some people will think that the legalization of abortion,
which they regard as murder, or homosexual conduct, which they regard as
unnatural and immoral, prevents them from according respect to the system.
Others will insist that the failure to protect abortion or the right of homosexuals to
form intimate relationships is the deal breaker. We can't make both of these
groups of people happy.
But it gets worse: The problem isn't simply that people disagree about these
substantive matters. They also disagree about how to interpret the Constitution in
the future, and we don't really know what the future holds. If the Constitution
includes not only the text but also judicial interpretations, and the various
institutions and practices of constitutional construction, the Constitution will
always be a moving target. It is constantly changing, because every year brings
new cases and new interpretations of the Constitution, which shift doctrines in one
direction or another.
Nobody who studies the history of the American
Constitution can fail to recognize that what the Constitution protects, permits, or
requires has changed considerably over the years, and not simply because of
Article V amendments.
It has changed because courts continuously offer
doctrinal glosses on the Constitution, which, in turn, lead to further glosses, and
glosses upon glosses. It has changed because new institutions arise (like political
parties, or political primaries, or the Federal Reserve Board, or the National
Security Administration, or the Department of Homeland Security, or the entire
apparatus of the administrative state) that change the practical meaning of the
Constitution on the ground, so to speak.
If the Constitution is a moving target, then it is hard to assent to the
legitimacy of the constitutional order on the basis of its content precisely because
one doesn't really know what that content is going to be. If everybody agreed
about what the Constitution meant, and how it would be applied to new cases, and
if it were clear exactly what new forms of constitutional construction would arise
in the future, then perhaps the content would be sufficiently determinate that
people could rationally offer their judgment that it is respect-worthy. But the
problem is that people disagree, and often quite strongly, about the best
interpretation of the Constitution. That is one reason why we have a Supreme
Court. And, as Whittington's studies of constitutional construction seem to
demonstrate, the forms and practices of constitutional construction have varied
widely over the years, so that they cannot really all be known in advance. Who
would have believed in 1787 that there would be an administrative state of the size
and scope we have today? All of these things might well have shaped our decision

8. See Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional
Meaning 1-19 (Harv. U. Press 1999).
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about whether the constitutional order is sufficiently legitimate if we could have
known about them in advance. But of course we can't know about them in
advance, and so we cannot rationally give our assent to the constitutional order
based merely on its content. Or so Frank seems to be arguing.
This leads to Frank's basic point. A content-based justification of legitimacy
holds that the Constitution (and the related practice of judicial review) helps
secure legitimacy because the Constitution has a particular substantive content
that details which exercises of state power the Constitution permits, requires, and
forbids. The Constitution creates a "legitimacy contract" between the state and
the people, or among the people themselves. 9 As long as the state abides by the
terms of the legitimacy contract-the substantive content of what is permitted,
required, and forbidden-people can rationally assent to the state's use of
coercion. However, Frank points out, the Constitution cannot be such a
legitimacy contract, because it is, as we have said, a moving target. For the
Constitution to be such a contract, its terms would have to be transparent-i.e.,
known to everyone in advance, and "publicly objective"-that is, acceptable to all
reasonable persons in a liberal society. But, Frank explains, "these publicity and
transparency requirements cannot be satisfied, at least not without reneging on a
modern liberal commitment to take pluralism seriously." 0
Well, couldn't the Constitution be a legitimacy contract of another sort?
Couldn't it provide legitimacy not because of its content, but on contentindependent grounds? Couldn't the Constitution be legitimate because of its
authorship, or because of the social fact that people just happen to accept it as
legitimate? Frank considers and rejects both of these possibilities. Both of these
approaches, he says, are in some tension with liberal political thought:
Content-independent conceptions seem very hard to reconcile with liberal
ideals of individual and collective self-government. Why should a current
generation of inhabitants allow themselves to be bound by a constitution just
because it is the one laid down by members of some prior generation? Why should I
concede legitimacy to some odious law, just because it is found compliant with some
body of norms that a dominant fraction of the country
regards as the country's
S . 11
constitution? What is that but the tyranny of the majority?
Frank admits that many theorists are attracted to content-independent
approaches based on authorship and acceptance, but he says that ultimately these
approaches to legitimacy won't wash.12
If people happened to accept a
dictatorship, or if the framers had insisted that only white male property owners
had the right to vote and participate in governance (perish the thought), that
would not make either a dictatorship or the practice of limiting political power to
white male property owners legitimate. Often people who make content-

9. See Michelman, Contract for Legitimacy, supra n. 2, at 120-21 (describing a "constitutional
contractual" model for legitimacy).
10. Id. at 127.
11. Id. at 126 n. 108.
12. Id. at 126-27.
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independent justifications for legitimacy are actually offering justifications for
legitimacy based on a guarantee of fair procedures for changing and administering
the law (like majority rule and separation of powers). In that case, Frank explains,
they are really offering content-based justifications, not justifications based on
what the framers said or what people accept. The source of legitimacy does not
rest on social acceptance or on what the framers said; it rests on the existence of
fair procedures for changing and administering the law.
Moreover, Frank explains, even if you ground legitimacy on a contract
promising fair procedures for changing and administering law, you can't really
avoid substantive questions that will produce profound disagreement, because not
all rational people would assent to a purely majoritarian system without some
guarantees of basic civil liberties and minority rights. And you still face the
problem of how thick your description of these basic civil liberties and minority
rights is going to be, and the very real possibility that these rights and liberties will
change over time in ways that lots of people would find objectionable. In short,
you have not succeeded in providing the degree of transparency and public
objectivity necessary to establish legitimacy.
All of this leads Frank to reject the notion that the Constitution, whether
viewed merely as its text, or as its text plus subsequent interpretations and
institutional constructions, can form a contract for legitimacy. 13 The central claim
of much of his constitutional scholarship in the past few years can be summed up
in this conclusion: If the Constitution does contribute to the legitimacy of a liberal
democracy, it is not because the Constitution is a legitimacy contract. If the
Constitution helps provide legitimacy, it must do so for other reasons and in other
ways.
What would those ways be? In his recent work, Frank has experimented
with a very different account of how legitimacy is produced. 14 He draws on Sandy
Levinson's idea of constitutional protestantism-the idea, roughly speaking, that
each member of the political community is authorized to decide what the
Constitution means for him or herself.
Each of the members of the political community, Frank argues, can
rationally reconstruct what they understand the Constitution-and the
legal/governmental system in place-to be. 15
In offering their rational
reconstruction, they are likely to interpret the existing system with some degree of
interpretive charity. This charity has three aspects: First, they will tend to
interpret existing practices as tending towards values of democracy, fairness, and
justice, even if existing practices fail to live up to those values completely. Second,
they will tend to interpret the system, where possible, as conforming to or
furthering their own visions of democracy, fairness, and justice, and interpret

13. Michelman, JudicialSupremacy, supra n. 2, at 611; Michelman, Ida's Way, supra n. 2, at 364-65.
14. See Michelman, Ida's Way, supra n. 2, at 362-65; Michelman, Faith and Obligation, supra n. 2, at
665-68.
15. Actually, he constructs a hypothetical individual, whom he calls "Ida," to do an idealized form
of this rational reconstruction. See Michelman, Ida's Way, supra n. 2, at 348.
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features that do not correspond as mistakes or peripheral features that, in time,
will be ameliorated or corrected. Third, they will tend to interpret the way the
system changes with some degree of "moral optimism; 1 6 that is, they will believe
in the possibility that, in the long run, the system can be moved closer to the ideals
of democracy, fairness, and justice, and that, in fact, the system will move in that
direction. Although Frank does not stress this point in his discussion, and indeed
only mentions it once in passing, I shall have a great deal to say later on about this
third feature of interpretive charity. I shall argue that the forward-looking
element of interpretation-the possibility of redemption from the past and hope
for the future-is central to judgments of political legitimacy.
Why will people tend to interpret the governmental system in place with
these forms of interpretive charity? It is because, Frank argues, most political
liberals believe that there is great moral value in enjoying the benefits of social
cooperation, law and order, and collaboration among citizens toward a better
society and better government-what he calls the "goods of union." 7 These
goods flow from people believing that they have a legitimate government that is
worthy of their respect; and these goods of union are undermined when people
lose respect for their government and can no longer regard it as legitimate.
Because Frank believes that political liberals want the goods of union not only
because they desire them but because they have independent moral value, they
will also want to believe that their government is legitimate, and so they will want
to choose that interpretation of the system in place that aims for that conclusion.
That means that all reasonable political liberals "have reason to be tolerant of
what they see as moral mishaps in the systemic history-specifically, by writing off
those mishaps as 'mistakes.' 8
Now, different people in the community will have different notions of what
those mistakes would be. That is because different people will have different
notions of what the Constitution, properly interpreted, really means and what the
best interpretation of current practices are. So one person might regard the
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade9 as a mistake that will someday be
corrected, or as a demerit against an otherwise respect-worthy system, and will
interpret the scope of the Roe decision and the principles announced in it very
narrowly so that it does as little harm as possible. Another person will regard Roe
v. Wade as an important reason why the system is respect-worthy, and will
interpret the decision and its principles very broadly. As a result, we can imagine
a large number of people having different portraits of the Constitution and the
governmental system in place. These portraits do not match up perfectly. But
what is important is that they all are interpretations of the Constitution and the
governmental system in place, so it is hoped that they overlap in substantial
respects. Frank wonders aloud whether this fact isn't akin to what Rawls meant

16. See id. at 364.
17. Id. at 346.
18. Id. at 364.

19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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by the "overlapping political-moral consensus '' 2° among differing, comprehensive
21
views of politics and morality that is necessary to ground political liberalism.
I hope by now you can see where this is leading. In Frank's vision, the
Constitution is not a contract for legitimacy. It does not promote legitimacy by
serving as an agreement on a certain set of essentials that is the same for everyone
who joins the agreement. If it assured legitimacy by being such a contract, it
would have to have the same meaning for everyone, and it can't do that if it is
going to garner reasonable acceptance by everyone in the political community.22
Rather, the Constitution promotes legitimacy and respect-worthiness by
being a common object of interpretation by different members of the political
community. As Frank explains it:
[If] the constitutional essentials serve as a kind of a political contract[, its]
adequately described terms. .. , one fears, will be either too thick or too thin to
carry the weight of a political-liberal legitimation project.
No such fear need attach to the governmental totalities the [members of the
political community] variously construct. A governmental totality is not a contract
that binds anyone; it is just. . . an empirically existent social practice. Although that
existent practice-totality is composed, in part, of laws meant to be binding, no
[person's] reconstruction of it has the binding force of a law.... The existent
practice we call the governmental totality is real, no doubt, and so it is, on some
level of possible description, the same for all participants. But there is no reason
why every single participant cannot or should not perceive it differently and
describe it differently and thereby accommodate the pull each reasonable
participant will feel, for good reason, toward finding it respect-worthy. Chartres can
be reported beautiful unanimously, by numerous, competent critics, all regarding it
partially from their several, differing angles of view. And the case also quite
possibly 23
could be that Chartres truly is beautiful, although no one ever will see it
"whole."
So, what makes the Constitution legitimate is that everyone in the political
community can, at least in theory, reasonably give their respect to the
governmental system in place as they understand it and interpret it.
There is an interesting irony in this argument that I think is particularly
worth stressing. Many people have worried that a "protestant" approach to
constitutional interpretation-the idea that everyone gets to decide what the
Constitution means for him or herself-is an invitation to anarchy, which will
destroy the advantages of the rule of law, social cooperation, and what Frank calls
24
the goods of union.
But it follows from Frank's argument that protestant

20. Michelman, Ida's Way, supra n. 2, at 364 (citing John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping
Consensus, in PoliticalLiberalism 133, 133-72 (Colum. U. Press 1996)).
21. Id.
22. See Michelman, Judicial Supremacy, supra n. 2, at 608-11.
23. Michelman, Ida's Way, supra n. 2, at 364-65 (footnotes omitted).
24. See e.g. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17
Const. Commentary 455 (2000); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On ExtrajudicialConstitutional
Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1997).
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constitutional interpretation-the fact of constitutional dissensus-may actually
help promote and secure social cooperation and the goods of union. Indeed, I will
argue later on in this essay that constitutional protestantism is necessary to
promote legitimacy, for reasons that go well beyond Frank's argument.
Note, however, what Frank has given up in his theory of legitimacy. He has
given up the notion that what makes a political regime legitimate and respectworthy is a single, common, publicly shared and publicly understood law or set of
rules. Instead, he claims, what secures legitimacy is the fact that people interpret
the Constitution and existing political practices differently-and differently
enough so that each of them can live with the interpretations they produce, and
assent to the coercion that states inevitably employ to secure law and order and
the other goods of union. Frank's theory of legitimacy attempts to make a virtue
out of necessity. Given that reasonable people disagree about what is just and
right, and given that they will also disagree about the best interpretation of the
Constitution and existing governmental practices, why shouldn't we say that what
produces the legitimacy of the Constitution and those practices is the fact that
people can all agree to disagree about what the Constitution and those practices
mean?
I am very much attracted to Frank's way of thinking about these matters.
Indeed, I believe that in some respects he does not go far enough in arguing for
the value of protestant constitutionalism as a key source of legitimacy in a liberal
democratic regime. In the pages that follow, I want to offer some friendly
amendments to the vision of constitutional legitimacy that he has offered here. I
will make three basic points. Each of them, in one way or another, has to do with
the temporal nature of judgments of legitimacy-with the fact that legitimacy is
not a judgment about the content of the laws or about the way things are at a
particular point in time, but a judgment about the constitutional/legal system that
looks backward to the past and forward to the future.
First, judgments of legitimacy are grounded in faith about the future as well
as in beliefs about the current content of the constitutional/legal system. This faith
cannot be reduced to rational calculation about future events discounted to the
present.
Rather, this faith is an attitude of attachment toward the
constitutional/legal system and a belief in the possibility of its progress and
redemption over time.
Second, for this reason, judgments of legitimacy require that members of the
political community be able to see themselves as part of a political project that
extends over time. This leads members of the political community to identify with
persons in the past, and with their ideals, their deeds, their promises, their
obligations, and their commitments. Members of the political community do this
in order to make sense of current controversies and the direction of political/legal
change. And in arguing with others about the legitimacy of what government
officials are doing and should be doing, people routinely make appeals to the past
and figures from the past, (e.g., the minutemen, the framers, soldiers who died in
previous wars, members of the civil rights movement, etc.) and to the political
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community's collective identification with the deeds, promises, obligations, and
commitments of the past as they understand them and interpret them in the
present. Hence legitimacy requires not only a belief about current content but an
understanding of the present through an identification with the past. Legitimacy
requires an ability to see both the past and the present as part of a collective
undertaking that begins in the past and extends outward into the future.
Third, judgments of legitimacy cannot rest solely on judgments of current
content because the future is uncertain and the nature of the constitutional/legal
system is continually changing. Rational reconstruction of the system may be
increasingly difficult to manage if the direction of change takes the system further
and further from one's preferred political values. Therefore the legitimacy of the
system requires that there be some method of feedback-whether formal or
informal-through which members of the political community can critique and
change the dominant understandings of the constitutional/legal system. In terms
of the American constitutional system, with its practice of judicial review, there
must be formal or informal methods through which protestant constitutional
interpreters can shape, influence, and affect judicial interpretations of the
Constitution.
II.

FAITH IN THE FUTURE AS A GROUND OF LEGITIMACY

Frank's theory of legitimacy, although not a contractual theory, is
nevertheless a content-based theory. People assent to the legitimacy of the
constitutional/legal regime because of what they reasonably believe to be the
content of the regime. Nevertheless, Frank assumes that reasonable people will
see different content in the constitutional/legal system. To cash out the meaning
of reasonable assent to the constitutional/legal system, Frank imagines a
hypothetical ideal observer whom he calls Ida. If Ida would give assent, based on
the content that she reasonably imagines the system to have, then the system is
legitimate, even if not everyone in the system actually does give assent. That is
because some individuals will refuse to engage in the necessary interpretive
charity, and others will simply not be reasonable.
In short, Frank argues that a constitutional/legal system is legitimate when
all reasonable members of the political community can assent to the content of the
constitutional/legal system as they reasonably understand and interpret it. Assent
is more than mere acquiescence to an oppressive regime that one has no control
over.
Rather, it is a form of positive acceptance that values the
constitutional/legal system because it offers the goods of union.
I think this approach is basically sound. But I also believe it is incomplete.
Particularly if we are speaking of legitimacy in democratic countries, legitimacy
requires more than rational assent to the content of the constitution and the
governmental system in place at a given point in time. For many if not most
people, legitimacy is not simply a function of current content. Rather, the
legitimacy of a government projects forward to the future and backward to the
past. It requires that members of the community have faith that the system will
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remain sufficiently acceptable for them to enjoy the goods of union, or, perhaps
even more optimistically, that things will actually get better in the future. Indeed,
one might think, the more hope for improvement in the future, all other things
being equal, the greater the legitimacy the constitutional/legal system will enjoy
among those subject to it. A system that is not minimally acceptable or barely so
might nevertheless be embraced as legitimate if the members of the political
community have faith that with time and effort, a more just and fair regime will
emerge. Surely this is how many revolutionary regimes are justified, and it is how
members of oppressed minority groups can still profess belief in the legitimacy of
an unjust regime that oppresses them. Conversely, if members lack faith in the
long-term acceptability of the system, if they believe that things will not get much
better and that the regime is on a downward spiral either towards incompetence
or tyranny, the legitimacy of the system is significantly undermined.
Frank views the question of legitimacy as a question of hypothetical
reasonable assent. But my point is that the question of faith in the future cannot
be reduced to a question of probable belief. Surely rational calculations must
enter into one's assumptions about what the future will be like, but that cannot be
the whole story. It flattens out the temporal element of legitimacy, reducing it to a
sort of present discounted value of the justice of the system. Rather, faith in the
future is also an attitude that members of the political community must have
toward the constitutional/legal system. That is what separates someone like
Frederick Douglass, who believed in the legitimacy of the American government,
from the followers of William Lloyd Garrison, who had no such faith.
Can we say that one of them was reasonable, and the other was not? We
know what happened in hindsight. But events might have turned out quite
differently, and quite badly, confirming Garrison's worst fears about the
consequences of a union with slaveholders. Or they might have turned out
splendidly, justifying Douglass's fondest hopes and his faith in the constitutional
system. What actually did happen (and is still in the process of happening) falls
somewhere in between these two possibilities: A Civil War that took half a million
lives, a new birth of freedom in the form of three constitutional amendments and
early civil rights legislation, a bitterly resisted Reconstruction that was ultimately
abandoned to White Redeemer governments, a slow descent into legally enforced
apartheid, a gradual bestowal of basic civil rights and liberties to blacks, and a
fitful and unsteady march of progress toward full citizenship that has left AfricanAmericans still largely segregated in housing and schools and with lower life
expectancies, higher infant mortality rates, smaller average incomes, and fewer job
opportunities than most whites. Perhaps we might say that, on the whole,
Douglass has been proven right in his faith in the American constitutional system.
But it took more than a century to prove him right. Can we honestly say that
Garrison's pessimism was more unreasonable than Douglass's optimism?
Legitimacy is a gamble about what the future will bring. This faith cannot be
reduced to the existing content of the laws or of the system of government at the
present, because those laws and that system may change. Rather, the faith that

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2003

11

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 39 [2003], Iss. 3, Art. 2
TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:485

legitimacy requires is faith despite uncertainty about how things will turn out. The
framers of the American Constitution spoke of their new system of government as
an experiment. By this they did not mean to treat it like one would treat a
scientific experiment, in which one does not care much whether a particular
iteration succeeds or fails. Rather, they were invested in this experiment; they
wanted it to succeed, and they wanted to believe that it would. That will to belief
is a central feature of legitimacy that cannot be reduced to the notion of
probabilities. We can say that this faith is beyond reasonableness, or we can say
that it is a necessary element of what we call "reasonable" assent. But we cannot
disregard it in any case.
At one point Frank says that political liberals should interpret the
constitutional/legal system "morally optimistic[ally]. '25 He meant, I think, that
they should try to view the constitutional/legal system in its best light. But I think
that there is more to optimism than this. An optimist is not just a person who
thinks things are going well. An optimist is a person who believes that however
bad things are in the present, they are going to get better in the future.
So when we say that political liberals interpret the constitutional/legal system
with moral optimism, we are also saying that they are willing to have some
confidence that the system can be improved. In other words, they believe in a
narrative of progress.
Why is belief in a narrative of progress important? If the system were
perfectly just, a narrative of progress would hardly be necessary. But in fact no
system that we know of is perfectly just. All have their failings, and some have
very serious shortcomings and evils. Believing that the constitutional/legal system
can and will get better is important for four reasons.
First, it helps buttress our confidence in systems that are minimally
acceptable in their current state. Second, it may lead us to give the benefit of the
doubt to systems that are not quite up to snuff, but that might, with some
alterations, become minimally acceptable. Third, faith in progress affects how we
view deviations from what we regard as fair, just, and democratic. It allows us to
interpret these deviations as mistakes or temporary failings inconsistent with the
true nature of the system, rather than as more or less permanent features that are
characteristic of the system or central to it. Fourth, belief in progress may be
important simply because it gives people hope and the will to carry on. If we
believed that the system would eventually stagnate, or become worse with time,
we might not see the value or the point of cooperation, and we might withhold our
assent to its respect-worthiness. Indeed, why should we respect a system that
makes no effort at all to become fairer, more democratic, or more just? There
seems something inherently wrong about the idea of a system simply standing pat,
smug and self-satisfied, when we know that evils and injustices exist, which they
always do.

25. Michelman, Ida's Way, supra n. 2, at 364.
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It is possible, perhaps even likely, that this focus on progress is
characteristically modernist. If we asked what legitimacy is like in traditional
societies, the narrative might be very different: A steady state is perfectly
acceptable, perhaps even desirable, because the greatest fear of such a society
might be the fear of falling away from the wisdom of the past. Nevertheless, we
are giving an account of legitimacy in liberal democratic societies, and so a
modernist attitude is hardly surprising. In general, moderns tend to believe
instinctively that progress is a good thing, not a bad thing, and a society that does
not attempt to improve itself will eventually decay, stagnate, and fall to ruin.
If this is so, then we have to modify Frank's account of legitimacy in the
following way: A constitutional/legal system's legitimacy requires not only that
people assent to the use of coercion to promote the goods of union and social
cooperation, but that the reason they assent also comes from some confidence in
the eventual improvement of the constitutional/legal system. That is to say, the
assent that gives rise to legitimacy may have as much to do with faith as with
reason.
But if that is so, then we have to reconsider Frank's argument that people
might not regard the Constitution as a legitimacy contract. Frank argued that no
one could rationally assent to such a contract because of inevitable interpretive
disagreements, so that one could never know what the future would hold. But if a
necessary element of legitimacy is faith-a confidence, as the Declaration of
Independence tells us, in the hand of Providence-then perhaps one can enter
into a contract even if one does not know the future exactly.
Indeed, when we look at commercial contracts, especially contracts that
govern long term relationships, the parties do not in fact know how the
relationship is going to turn out. They have to have a certain degree of faith. They
have to be willing to make a commitment to work with each other so that
uncertainties are resolved, disputes are compromised, and the relationship goes
forward. If people entered into contracts only when they were sure of their
agreements' future interpretation and consequences, people would never enter
into contracts. Contracts, like every other act of social co-operation, require
confidence, trust, and, dare one say it, faith in the future. If the Constitution is not
a contract for legitimacy, it is not merely because its scope is uncertain. It is
because we ourselves did not enter into it. But who is the "we" that could enter
into such a compact? That question brings us to the next phase of our inquiry: our
relationship to the past, our identification with those who came before us, and the
idea of a transtemporal collective subject.
III. IDENTIFICATION WITH THE PAST

Having considered the importance of faith in the future to legitimacy, let us
now consider the importance of connection to the past. I have said that legitimacy
involves belief in a narrative of progress. But that narrative is also the narrative of
a collective subject, a people who attempts to fulfill certain political and moral
commitments in historical time.
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Frank rejects the notion that the fact that the American Constitution was
framed and ratified by the founding generation can by itself be a sufficient ground
26
for its current legitimacy.
His arguments are quite compelling, and I will not
rehearse them here. He points out, quite correctly, that the present belongs to the
living, not the dead, and that we make use of the work of those who came before
to the extent that it is useful to us or that we regard it as justified. In this sense, he
argues, fidelity to the authors or framers reduces to a concern with the
acceptability of the content of the constitutional/legal system.
Frank's argument is premised on a certain view, widely held, for why
authorship matters for legitimacy. Authorship counts because authors make laws
and those laws remain in place and are binding until they are changed. This is
implausible because we are not necessarily the same "we" as the "we" that created
the constitutional system. So what the earlier "we" did cannot logically be binding
27
upon us.
But we might imagine our relationship to the past in a different way.
Suppose we identify with the past, and with the people who lived in the past, and
with their struggles and their deeds. Then the reason why we are bound is that we
take pride in, or feel at home in connecting ourselves to them and identifying
28
ourselves with them. We see ourselves as part of them, and them as part of us.
It is important to recognize that this kind of identification is quite distinct
from following the original understandings of the framers of a document. We
might identify with the framers, but we might also identify with the generation
that fought the Revolutionary War. We might also identify with the achievements
and struggles of individuals and groups after the time the Constitution was
29
Indeed, it is
ratified, including, for example, members of social movements.
likely that the awe and respect that lawyers have for the framers is not simply
because of the fact that they wrote the Constitution, but because we consider the
framing of that document to be a great accomplishment that we identify with as
our own as members of the American political community. (To be sure,
originalist theories of interpretation may tend to piggy-back on this respect and
identification, but the justification of originalism as a theory of legal interpretation
lies elsewhere, in the notion that the original understanding expresses the meaning
of binding legal commands. 30 )
This idea of identification with the past, and with those who lived before us,
and with their struggles, their deeds and their accomplishments is so familiar that
we often forget that it is a form of rhetorical or narrative construction. But
26. Michelman, Contractfor Legitimacy, supra n. 2, at 126-27 & n. 108.
27. Michelman, ConstitutionalAuthorship, supra n. 2, at 1622-25.
28. See J.M. Balkin, The Declarationand the Promise of a Democratic Culture, 4 Widener L. Symp.
J. 167, 175-80 (1999).
29. On the notion of "post-enactment" history of constitutional provisions, see Reva B. Siegel, She
the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev.
947, 1046 (2002) and Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory:
The Case of OriginalMeaning, 85 Geo. L.J. 1765, 1811-16 (1997).
30. See generally Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original
Intent, and Judicial Review (U. Press Kan. 1999).
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construction it is. When we say that we Americans did this or did that, fought this
war or that war, we are identifying ourselves with others, we are saying that we are
part of them and they are part of us.
Every Passover, Jews all over the world engage in the same narrative and
rhetorical construction. They gather around the table and recite the Passover
Seder, saying that we were once slaves in Egypt, and the Eternal our God brought
us out of the house of bondage with a strong hand and an outstretched arm, with
signs and wonders. None of the people at the table actually were slaves in Egypt.
And yet they tell themselves that they were redeemed, that a promise was made to
them, a promise that yet will be fulfilled. At one point in the Seder, the story is
to you?" 31
told of the wicked son, who says, "What is [the meaning of] this service
By saying "you," the text adds, he "exclud[es] himself from the community [and
thus] has denied that which is fundamental. 312 What has the wicked son denied?
It is identification with the people who lived in the past and their experiences, and
their sufferings, and their deeds, and thus, the promise that God made to them.
And because he dis-identifies, he is wicked. So the text of the Seder says, "You,
therefore, [may reproach him] and say to him: 'It is because of this that the L-rd
did for me when I left Egypt'; 'for me' - but not for him! If he had been there, he
would not have been redeemed!"" The wicked son is excluded from the covenant
because he does not accept the narrative construction of himself as part of the
Jewish people, a people that exists over time, and is still bound by that covenant.
The lesson of the Seder text is that it is a bad thing to fail to identify with the
past, and with those persons who lived before us. The reason is obvious. The
point of the service is to renew association and connection to a religious and
national tradition that stretches over many years. It keeps the tradition going. It
preserves and continues something valuable and worthy. Indeed, the Seder notes,
"In every generation a person is obligated to regard himself as if he had come out
of Egypt, as it is said: 'You shall tell your child on that day, it is because of this
that the L-rd did for me when I left Egypt."' 34 The service calls upon parents to
reinforce the idea of identification with a collective subject: what happened in
Egypt happened to the Jews as a people, and thus to the parents (and to their
children) as well.
This identification with the past and with the deeds of the past is important
not only for religious communities, but also for political communities. And thus
we might ask ourselves whether continuity and identification with the past and the
deeds of the past, as part of a continuing project that is extended into the future, is
not also one of the "goods of union" that liberal societies seek to achieve.

31. Chabad-Lubavitch Media Ctr., Chabad.org,Chabad.orgHolidays, The Passover Haggadah (part
2) <http://www.chabad.org/holidays/passover/pesach.asp?AID=1737> (accessed Mar. 4, 2004) (internal
quotations omitted).
32. Id.
33. Id. The text literally says, "blunt his teeth," i.e., speak harshly to him in the same way he has
spoken to us.
34. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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It is true that liberals, like most moderns, are suspicious of servitude to the
past and to unquestioned respect for tradition. They celebrate individualism, and
resist viewing individuals merely as parts of an organic whole called society. But
that does not mean that liberals might not find something important in viewing
political societies as continuing over time, or in understanding them as having
histories and directions, and engaging in temporally extended projects. Indeed,
one of those projects might be the gradual improvement of the conditions of
society, or the gradual achievement of fairness, justice, and democracy.
It might be a good thing for liberal societies to think of themselves as having
embarked on such a project, a project that was begun by people who lived in the
past, is continued in the present, and, hopefully, will be carried on into the future.
Belief in the cross-temporal identification of the past, present, and future
members of the society is actually quite important to make sense of a narrative of
progress. To state a claim such as "Americans outgrew slavery, property
qualifications for voting, sexism, and Jim Crow, and eventually produced a
country that respects basic rights and liberties" is already to identify each
generation with the others as all being part of America, and the deeds of each
generation as all forming part of a general project-the realization in history of
principles of fairness, justice, and democracy that Americans are committed to as
a people. A narrative of this sort is a narrative of a collective subject, of a people,
its words and its deeds, its promises and commitments, and their eventual
fulfillment over time.
What does this identification have to do with the political legitimacy of a
constitutional/legal system? It allows us to see what we do today as a continuation
of the great deeds of the past. It allows us to be inspired by and ennobled by what
was done in the past, so that we can gain authority from the fact that we are
continuing an important and valuable undertaking. It interprets the past in light
of present conditions, and helps us understand, in our own time, the principles
fought for and commitments not yet fulfilled by past generations. Taking
inspiration from the past, and from the struggles, promises, and achievements of
the past is the work of the present, albeit always shaped by present requirements
and controversies. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that every successful social
movement in the United States has drawn on images of the founding generation,
their great deeds, and their commitment to liberty, as a way of criticizing the
legitimacy of existing practices and asserting the moral imperative for reform.
When Americans have wanted to show that their practices are legitimate, they
have called upon the memory of previous generations, especially the founders.
And when they have wanted to decry the injustice and the illegitimacy of the
present, they have also called upon the past, and especially the founders. Why is
that? Is this merely a rhetorical quirk? Or does it tell us something very
important about what legitimacy is and how it is established?
The answer, I think, is that an appeal to the past, and to the great deeds of
the past, and to the struggles of the past, is a way of showing that we are being true
to a larger set of commitments to liberty, equality, and justice that we believe were
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begun with the nation's founding and have been carried forward to the present.
Identification with the past is a way of encouraging progress in the present, and
shaming and delegitimating the present's less savory features. It matters not
whether those who lived in the past owned slaves or had any number of illiberal
beliefs. What is important is that we understand them to have been part of a
larger commitment, a larger project of realizing liberty, equality, democracy, and
justice. The use of those who lived in the past, and their deeds, and their
sufferings, their struggles and their victories, can be used either to legitimate or
delegitimate aspects of present practices.
This identification with the past is deeply connected to our faith in the
future. For we look at the future through the trajectory provided to us by our
interpretation of the meaning of the past. We invoke the names of Jefferson,
Lincoln, and King as guideposts to understanding what the present situation is and
how we should respond to it, how we should go forward, what the nature of our
project is.
If we think about our relationship to the past in this way, there is a sense in
which the Constitution could be a certain type of legitimacy contract. It would
not, to be sure, be a contract between the present and the past, or between the
past and the future. Rather it would be an understanding among ourselves about
who we are, where we came from, and where we are going. It would not be at all
like a commercial contract, but something much more religious in character-a
covenant that binds us with those who came before us and whose promises,
principles, obligations, and strivings we bequeath to future generations. Such a
covenant must always be indeterminate in scope and application. For we do not
know the future, and we do not know what the problems and crises of the future
will be.35 All we know, or rather, all we hope, is that those who follow will identify
with us as we identified with those past; that they will employ those identifications
and understandings to forge the path they will follow, and that they will call that
identification, and that following, fidelity.
From this standpoint, the Constitution would be not so much a legitimacy
contract as a legitimacy project. 36 We must think of legitimacy not simply as a
feature of the current content of legal systems but also as a project, an
understanding of the past used to countenance the present and offering goals that
we hope will be fulfilled in the future. The word "project" is particularly
appropriate, for the narrative imagination that undergirds legitimacy conceives the
trajectory of the past and projects it outward into the future. Our assent to the
content of the constitutional/legal system-the very way that we characterize that
system in its best light, identifying its central features and its mistakes-is
inevitably shaped by our identification with and understanding of the past, the

35. Cf. M'Culloch v. Md., 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (describing the U.S. Constitution as "intended to
endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs").
36. See Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 11-12 (Princeton U. Press
1999) (speaking of the vindication of the principles of the Declaration of Independence as an ongoing
project).
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great deeds and failures of the past, the lessons learned, the promises made, the
The past (and our imagined
debts assumed, the obligations taken on.
reconstruction of it) is the great intellectual toolkit for bestowing legitimacy or
illegitimacy on the present, and giving a sense of what legitimacy might mean in
the future.
The legitimacy of the constitutional/legal system, in other words, is not
simply a matter of its current content. It is always imbricated with the past and
projected toward the future. It is always premised on an interpretation of and
selective identification with the past, the creation of a transtemporal "us," whom
we revere and of whom our present selves are merely the latest installment.
Legitimacy is shaped and constituted not merely by rational assent but by an
affective relation of connection to the past, and by an attitude-of hope,
optimism, expectation, or despair-about the future. In what sense, then, should
we say that assent must be reasonable in order for the system to be legitimate?
What we mean by "reasonable" cannot be divorced from these attitudes and
identifications. They are the underpinnings of our conclusion that the country we
live in, the regime to whose laws we are subject, is legitimate or illegitimate, is
worthy or unworthy of our respect. For "respect" itself is not merely a judgment
of rationality, it is also an attitude that we have toward the object of our
admiration.
Thinking about Frank's version of protestantism in this light, we can see that
legitimacy is not premised on a simple contract. But it may also involve something
much more complicated than he suggests: It is not simply isolated individuals
having their separate views about the constitutional/legal system. It is those
individuals having views about themselves as part of a larger enterprise, as a part
of a political community with a past, a present, and a future.
IV.

PROTESTANT CONSTITUTIONALISM AS A FEEDBACK MECHANISM

I've argued that theories of constitutional legitimacy cannot ignore a
necessary temporal element. Legitimacy is not just a property of the Constitution
as it exists in the present. It also depends on our views about our relationship to
the past and our hopes for the future. Interpretive charity requires identification
with the deeds of the past and hope and optimism about the future. To believe in
legitimacy, it is not enough that people believe in the acceptability of what is
happening now. They must also believe that the object they interpret will remain
legitimate in the future. Legitimacy, in this sense, is a matter not of reason, but of
faith. It is a gamble about what the future will bring. That gamble may be an
educated gamble, a gamble inspired by deep emotional commitment and
attachment to a land, a country, a people, or a vision of a nation, but it is a gamble
nonetheless.
Ironically, this lack of faith is what both the followers of Garrison and the
Southerners who seceded from the Union lacked. Neither group had faith that the
problem created by the co-existence of slave states and free states could be
resolved peacefully in the future. Garrison believed that the North would be
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corrupted by the South and the South's increasing demands for respect for the
institutions of chattel slavery. The problem wasn't merely that slavery was unjust,
it was that there was no hope that a union with slaveholders would ameliorate this
injustice. Indeed, it would probably make it worse.
Conversely, Southern defenses of secession were premised on a lack of faith
in the ability of Southerners to protect their interests in a country with an
increasing number of free states. Sooner or later, Southerners feared, the North
and the West would flex their collective muscles and gang up on the South. Even
if the system of government was acceptable in the present, they feared it would
not long remain so. That is why the Union lost legitimacy for them, and that is
why they seceded. In offering these remarks I am most certainly not defending
the Southern arguments, but merely noting the deep connection between
legitimacy and faith in the future. Ultimately, one cannot ground a legitimate
government except on such faith. That faith may be reasonable or unreasonable,
but it must exist if any experiment in government-for that is what all democratic
constitutions are-is to succeed.
My third and final point also focuses on the dynamic nature of the
constitutional system. Frank argues that the system is legitimate if reasonable
people can assent to its content as they interpret it. This is a theory that allows
people, in good conscience, to accept the system. Legitimacy is a matter of acts of
individual conscience collectively considered. This test of legitimacy, as I have
noted, is based on people's present interpretation of the system of governance.
But the system of government is not static. It is dynamic. This produces a third
set of issues for Frank, which bear important similarities to his own arguments
against the plausibility of a content-based contract for legitimacy.
The constitutional system is legitimate as long as individuals can reasonably
interpret the content of the constitutional system in a way acceptable to them.
The problem is that the constitutional system is a moving target. It will not stay
the same. Every year brings new court decisions, alterations in the customary
understandings of inter-branch and federal-state relations, novel forms of
constitutional construction, and adaptations and mutations of older forms. The
Constitution is like Heraclitus's river.
If the content and features of the constitutional system are constantly
changing, so too must the individual interpretations of citizens in the system. If
citizens refuse to acknowledge changes in the system, at some point their
interpretations will simply be unreasonable and thus inadequate to serve as
grounds for reasoned assent to the system. At some point, wishful thinking will
meet up with hard reality. One may insist that the best interpretation of the
Constitution is one in which certain conduct is constitutionally protected, but one
may still be arrested for engaging in it because those who control practical
enforcement of the laws don't agree with one's protestant constitutional vision.
Moreover, the direction of change in the system may not be to every citizen's
liking. For some the system may become more and more acceptable, for others
less and less. For example, each time that abortion rights are expanded, pro-life
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citizens will, in theory at least, have to reconfigure their views about the best
interpretation of the system-they must decide which cases can be read narrowly
or broadly, and which features can easily be dismissed as mistakes. As the system
changes, it may be more and more difficult for some citizens to do this and still
conclude that the system is respect-worthy.
Thus, constitutional change puts Frank's conception of legitimacy at risk.
But change is inevitable. So legitimacy must involve more than Frank says it does.
It must be more than the mere fact of assent to current conditions consistent with
everyone's individual conscience. There must also be some kind of feedback
mechanism that makes the direction of constitutional change responsive to
popular opinion about the Constitution. If such a feedback mechanism is missing,
there is no guarantee that the Constitution that was respect-worthy at one time
will not lose that legitimacy. It is not enough that individuals can interpret the
Constitution according to their own lights. As the law changes, their rational
reconstruction of the law may become increasingly difficult to maintain. An everchanging Constitution will make rational reconstruction (and thus legitimacy)
impossible for some significant class of citizens. Thus, legitimacy requires that
individual citizens have a stake in the development of constitutional norms.
Even if people have individual views about what the Constitution means to
them, there will still be central forms of authority with practical control over the
law-making and law-enforcement apparatuses of a country. One may well be
entitled to one's views about the constitutional/legal system. But that is cold
comfort if one knows in practice that one's views are going to drift further and
further from the received interpretation by legal actors with practical power, so
that one continually must rationally reconstruct a law that seems increasingly bad.
Control over constitutional change is not evenly distributed. Judges,
government officials, and leaders of successful social movements probably have
the most practical control. The vast majority of citizens who 37do not fit into any of
these categories are likely to have the least degree of control.
Frank's use of an ideal observer, Ida, who gives or withholds assent to the
legitimacy of the system, glosses over the asymmetry in social position and
political power of different actors in the system.
Some persons have
disproportionate influence on the development of constitutional norms. An ideal
observer does not have any particular position in society. That is because he or
she is not anybody in particular. But in the real world, ordinary citizens know that
they inhabit certain social roles, with accompanying degrees of powerlessness.
They know that they are not Supreme Court Justices, and therefore that other
people will be shaping the direction and development of constitutional norms in
ways that they may not like. Frank's use of an ideal observer, I think, reflects his
overriding concern with viewing legitimacy as an issue of conscience, rather than
as viewing it as a mechanism of socialfeedback between citizens and the system of

37. See J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 Fordham L. Rev.
1703, 1724-26 (1997).
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government that helps citizens maintain reasonable assent to the system. But both
perspectives, I think, are necessary.
Legitimacy requires that people be able to subject their system of
human rights law, to democratic processes of
government and, in particular,
•• 38
deliberation and critique. But if so, there has to be some mechanism or series of
mechanisms by which people's views about the Constitution have a decent shot at
becoming widely accepted so that their critique can have efficacy.
How, then, can we justify a theory of legitimacy based on the rational
acceptability of individual interpretations of the constitutional system when most
citizens do not control the direction of constitutional change? To be sure, the
Constitution can be amended through popular will. But in the United States, at
In practice, most
least, it is extremely hard to amend the Constitution.
constitutional change occurs through constitutional constructions by the political
branches, and through interpretations by Article III judges. So there must be
some way for individual citizens to offer their protestant interpretations of the
Constitution so that they have a chance at becoming accepted and ratified by
courts with the power to change constitutional law through Article III
interpretation.
There are two standard ways by which protestant constitutional
interpretations influence the development of constitutional norms. The first is
through the political party system, which promotes particular interpretations of
the Constitution through legislation and judicial appointments. The second is
through social movement contestation, which attempts to change attitudes
(especially elite attitudes) about what the Constitution means, and hence
influences judicial decisionmaking, because judges are largely drawn from elites.
Thus, a pro-life citizen can influence the development of the Constitution in
one of two ways. She can support political parties that take pro-life stands or
pressure existing parties to take such stands, with the idea that party politicians
will use their influence to pass laws that erode abortion rights and appoint pro-life
judges to the bench. These judges, in turn, will limit or overrule previous abortion
rights decisions and promote the rights that pro-life citizens seek to expand and
protect. In the alternative, pro-life citizens can engage in social movement protest
against abortions and abortion rights with the idea of gradually changing the
public's mind (and the minds of political and legal elites) about the morality of
abortion and the value of abortion rights. Effecting a successful shift in popular
opinion, in turn, will gradually lead to more pro-life legislation and administrative
regulation. Shifting popular opinion will also result in the median judge in the
system taking a more pro-life view, and interpreting the Constitution and other
laws accordingly.
In fact both of these strategies have worked for pro-life citizens since the
Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade. Social movement contestation
against Roe produced a series of state and congressional laws withholding

38. See Michelman, Human Rights, supran. 2, at 69.
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government funding of abortions, requiring consent or notification of parents for
abortions by minors, and limiting access to late term abortions and the use of
abortion procedures like so-called "partial birth" abortions. Influence on political
parties-and in particular the Republican Party-led to the appointment of a
large number of pro-life judges or, at the very least, judges who had only
lukewarm support for abortion rights. Although these changes have not been
sufficient to overturn Roe v. Wade, they have had a lasting impact on access to
abortion. For example, abortions are not practically available in many areas of
the country; Congress has withdrawn federal funding for abortions, and many
states have restrictions on access to abortions by minors, waiting period statutes,
and other laws that limit the total number of abortions in the United States.39 The
Supreme Court has also modified its views on abortion; not only has it upheld
denial of federal funding and some limitations on access to abortions for minors, it
has also cut back significantly on the original Roe v. Wade decision (without
overruling it) in Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.40
These features of the American political system have surely not given prolife citizens everything that they want. Many abortions still occur, and to pro-life
citizens, these abortions constitute the murder of innocent human beings.
Nevertheless, political parties and social movement contestation have shaped the
development of constitutional norms concerning abortion. They have allowed
pro-life citizens to nudge the Constitution closer to their favored direction, and
thus have helped preserve their ability rationally to reconstruct the constitutional
system in ways that permit their reasonable assent to it.
We can view this feedback process in another way. A constitutional/legal
system is legitimate to the extent that all can reasonably assent to the system. This
formula implicitly opposes reasonable assent to "unreasonable" refusal. There are
two kinds of unreasonable refusal. The first comes from people who unreasonably
think that the system is too wicked by their lights for them to consent to
participate and enjoy the goods of union; they are more picky than they should be.
The second kind of unreasonable refusal comes from people who have
unreasonable views about what is just or unjust, good or bad, constitutional or
unconstitutional. They cannot assent to the constitutional/legal system because
their substantive views fall outside the spectrum of reasonable belief. Noting the
existence of both of these categories, however, begs the question of what kinds of
political beliefs should count as reasonable. There is no transhistorical answer to
this question. Rather, to a very significant degree we judge reasonableness by
reference to the spectrum of political opinions that exist in a democracy at a
particular time. This is so even though history repeatedly suggests that large
numbers of people can have unreasonable political beliefs judged by the values of
a later day.

39. Jack M. Balkin, Roe v. Wade: A Critical Introduction 5-7 (unpublished manuscript 2004) (copy
on file with Tulsa Law Review).
40. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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The point is that "reasonable" is not a stable category. It is always being
constructed in part through the actual practice of politics. What practices are
legitimate and not legitimate, what reasonable people think the Constitution
means, and what injustices and imperfections a reasonable person would be
willing to put up with to enjoy the benefits of social cooperation are continuously
being shaped by everyday political contestation. The appeal to an ideal observer
like Ida glosses over this fact.4 Obviously, Frank could be arguing that reasonable
assent requires beliefs that are reasonable from some transhistorical standard.
But because his project is to explain legitimacy given the existence of long
standing and durable disagreements about what is just and unjust, he is probably
not embracing that view.
Thus, if legitimacy depends on reasonable assent, then legitimacy also
depends on responsiveness to those positions that are thought to be reasonable or
unreasonable at a particular point in time. Protestant constitutionalism exercised
through social movements and political parties helps construct the scope and
distribution of public opinion, the shape of the political center, and thus judgments
about which political beliefs are within the spectrum of reasonable opinion at any
given time and which beliefs are "off the wall." Social movement contestation and
political agitation help shape the "reasonable"-or, perhaps more correctly, the
distribution of the "reasonable"-that sits at the heart of judgments of legitimacy.
Even if social movement contestation doesn't succeed in changing the
judiciary's mind on a particular issue, it preserves-and simultaneously
constructs-a space of "reasonable disagreement" by attempting to ensure that
the center of the spectrum of public opinion does not stray so far from the social
movement's views that members of the social movement become regarded as
wholly unreasonable.
The pro-life movement is a good example of how
reasonableness is constructed in practice. Even though pro-life adherents have
not yet succeeded in overturning Roe v. Wade, social movement contestation and
political agitation have ensured that the pro-life position remains a "reasonable"
position that other reasonable people must respect or at least pay attention to.
41. The boundaries of reasonableness-i.e., what reasonable people regard as "off the wall"change over time, and so a substantial percentage of people in the past may have had unreasonable
views by today's standards. In 1850, for example, the views of slaveholders would have to be consulted
along with those of opponents of slavery. Thus, it is possible that the constitutional system in 1850 was
not legitimate in Frank's sense not only because abolitionists could not give rational assent to it, but
because slaveholders (who were fearful of what the North would do) could not do so either.
Defining legitimacy in terms of an ideal observer also tends to gloss over the background
question of whose (reasonable) beliefs count in assessing the legitimacy of the constitutional/legal
system. The beliefs that count, presumably, are the beliefs of members of the political community. A
problem arises, however, when the constitutional dispute concerns who should form part of that
community; that is, when the nature of the political community is deeply contested, and that contest is
part of the dispute over the legitimacy of the constitutional/legal system. According to Frank's theory,
the constitutional/legal system in 1850 would be legitimate if both slaveholders and opponents of
slavery could reasonably assent to the system. But what about the views of the slaves themselves,
whom the slaveholders did not regard as part of the political community? Do they count in assessing
whether the constitutional/legal system is legitimate? In today's world, we might wonder whether the
views of aliens (both legal and illegal) should matter in assessing the legitimacy of the
constitutional/legal system, given the government's policies of arrest, detention, and surveillance of
aliens following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
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The very success of the pro-life movement in shaping public opinion means that if
pro-life citizens cannot offer their reasonable assent to the constitutional/legal
system, that is a genuine problem for the legitimacy of the system.
In this sense, political agitation and social movement contestation have a
"defensive" value in constructing the reasonable: they keep dissenting citizens'
views within the spectrum of reasonable opinion. But they have "offensive" value
as well. Over time, political protest and social movement contestation can help
delegitimate certain practices-like abortion, busing, racial profiling, or sodomy
laws-in the minds of the public, and thus cause certain views that were once
thought reasonable and acceptable to be deemed unreasonable or even "off the
wall. 42 When social movement contestation succeeds in delegitimating a practice
sufficiently, it also usually succeeds in getting courts to ratify that conclusion
through their interpretations of the Constitution, and this brings us, once again, to
the key point that protestant constitutionalism sometimes leads to changes in the
"official" constitutional doctrine practiced and enforced by courts.
In short, a theory of legitimacy grounded in reasonable assent to the
constitutional/legal system must recognize the historical and constructed nature of
political reason and the central function this construction plays in grounding
judgments of legitimacy. Protestant constitutional interpretation plays a crucial
role in constructing the boundaries and the distribution of reasonable political
positions at any particular point in time. And it offers a crucial feedback
mechanism that shapes the development of constitutional doctrine in the long run.
I have argued that because constitutional change is inevitable, it is important
that citizens have means of nudging the constitutional-system-in-practice closer to
their preferred interpretation of the Constitution. The feedback between citizens'
preferred interpretations of the Constitution and the development of the
constitutional-system-in-practice turns out to be a necessary, if not sufficient,
condition for producing a respect-worthy system. Indeed, in the American
constitutional system, political and social movements, with their protestant
interpretations of the American Constitution, are the great engine of
43
constitutional change.
Many scholars have argued that protestant
constitutionalism is a threat to the legitimacy and the stability of the constitutional
system. They have argued for what Levinson calls "constitutional catholicism,"
the view that a central institution-in this case, the courts and in particular the
Supreme Court of the United States-must have the final say as to the meaning of

42. In fact, if a social movement succeeds in substantially or fully delegitimating a particular
practice (like race or sex discrimination), it not only ensures that its views are reasonable, but it also
makes some of the positions it opposes "unreasonable," and thus irrelevant to judgments of legitimacy.
Consider, for example, people who want to reinstitute slavery for African-Americans and order
reparations for the property seized from former slaveowners by the (illegal) Thirteenth Amendment.
There is little problem if these people cannot assent to the legitimacy of the constitutional/legal system.
Their position is simply "off the wall" in today's political universe and so their failure to assent is
unreasonable.
43. See the argument in Jack M. Balkin, Idolatry and Faith:The Jurisprudenceof Sanford Levinson,
38 Tulsa L. Rev. 553, 571-77 (2003).
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the Constitution." Only the existence of such a final central institutional authority
can produce the predictability and stability necessary for the legitimacy of a
constitutional regime.
But, as we have seen, the reverse is true. The fact that people have their
own interpretations of what the Constitution means, and the fact that the political
system is full of dissensus and disagreement is actually necessary to the
achievement of a legitimate constitutional system, because constitutional
protestantism is a necessary feature of the process of constitutional change.
Constitutional change occurs in large part because individuals have different views
about what the Constitution means, and they try to convince others that their view
is correct. They join social movements and political parties to promote their
favored views. Social movements and political parties, in turn, influence public
opinion and shape who sits on the judiciary. Shifts in public opinion and in the
ideological character of the judiciary, in turn, produce changes in constitutional
interpretation and constitutional doctrine. What gives the system of judicial
review its legitimacy, in other words, is its responsiveness-over the long run-to
society's competing views about what the Constitution means.4 ' The dialectic
between a central judicial authority and popular interpretations of the
Constitution-or between constitutional catholicism and constitutional
protestantism-turns out to be crucial to the preservation of a legitimate
constitutional system.
This system of feedback between popular interpretations and institutional
46
effects is partially but imperfectly democratic.
It was not planned or designed,
but arose over time through various political and constitutional controversies in
the United States. Other systems of government might achieve it through
different means. Nevertheless, because the Constitution is ever changing, some
form of feedback along these lines is necessary to shore up legitimacy, in addition
to Frank's vision of an overlapping consensus of rational reconstructions by
individual members of the citizenry. It is not enough that citizens can imagine a
Constitution they can live with. Their imagination must not stray too far from the
Constitution in practice, and that can only be the case if their beliefs about what
the Constitution should mean have some feedback effect on what the Constitution
in practice becomes over time. Frank's theory of legitimacy values constitutional
protestantism as a way of preserving conscience and gaining assent. I argue that
constitutional protestantism is also crucial to producing a roughly democratic and
responsive mechanism for critiquing and changing the constitutional/legal system.
An important feature of this system of feedback is that it is informal. It may
or may not be part of the Hartian "rule of recognition" that specifies what makes

44. See Sanford Levinson, ConstitutionalFaith 23-30 (Princeton U. Press 1988).
45. Or, as Robert Post has put it, the legitimacy of the system depends on the connections between
constitutional law and constitutional "culture." Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 8-11 (2003).
46. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understandingthe ConstitutionalRevolution, 87 Va. L.
Rev. 1045, 1076 (2001).
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something binding law.47 So I am not sure whether or not it counts as a procedural
guarantee of legitimacy of the form that Frank rejected earlier as a basis for
legitimacy. But, of course, my point is not that this feedback mechanism is
sufficient to ensure legitimacy. Rather, I argue that if one adopts the protestant
theory of constitutional legitimacy that I identify with Frank, it is not enough that
the system-as-interpreted-by-everyone be consistent with everyone's individual
consciences. It is also necessary that such a feedback mechanism exist. Thus, we
can understand constitutional protestantism both as a theory about who has
authority to interpret the Constitution (everyone) and a description of a process
by which and through which individual and dissenting constitutional
interpretations become widely accepted and promulgated. Sanford Levinson's
original use of constitutional protestantism was motivated by a concern with
conscience, and that is how Frank has taken up the idea. My view, by contrast, is
that protestantism must S.be48understood as one pole of a dialectic with its opposite,
constitutional catholicism.
It is part of a dialectical process of democratic
responsiveness between individual citizens' views about the higher law and the
way that higher law is recognized and enforced by legal officials.
V.

CONCLUSION: ANOTHER VIEW OF THE CATHEDRAL

Frank's view compares the Constitution to Chartres, gracing both elements
with the comparison. People can disagree about what Chartres is, but they can all
agree about its greatness. What Frank says about Chartres might equally well be
said of Frank himself. Like Chartres, Frank's work is majestic. Like Chartres, his
work can be viewed from many angles. Because he has contributed to so many
fields, and so well, each of us can draw our own vision of what his work is like, and
reflect on how it has affected and influenced us. People may well dispute whether
the American Constitution is legitimate and thus worthy of our respect. But on
one point we can surely agree: Whether or not our Constitution is respect-worthy,
Frank Michelman certainly is.

47. See Balkin, supra n. 43, at 576-77 (discussing notion of a "constitutional demi-monde" of
protestant interpretations, which are neither fully law nor merely arguments of policy).
48. Id. at 573-77.
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